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CHECKING IN: HISTORIC CELL SITE LOCATION
INFORMATION AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
*

Christopher Fox

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty-five years, the number of cell phone subscribers in the United States has increased from slightly over 200,000
1
in 1985 to roughly 293 million in 2010. Cell phones are now the only phones used in over one quarter of all American households, a
2
percentage that has nearly tripled in the last five years. Moreover,
several modern phones are equipped with GPS programs that allow
3
subscribers to accurately and easily navigate to their destination using the phone that they likely have on or near their person for the
majority of the day.
As technology has developed over the last quarter century, the
average person’s life has changed through the adoption and utilization of new devices. Not only are cell phones regularly used for
checking emails or updating one’s Facebook status, but the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) estimates that wireless phones
4
are responsible for about seventy percent of all 911 calls. In re-

*

J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, The University
of Texas at Austin. I would like to thank the proprietors of El Dubs for consistently
giving me gratuitous copies of their daily newspaper with my morning coffee. The
Third Circuit decision that is at the heart of this Comment and which piqued my interest in this subject was brought to my attention because of their excellent customer
service and appreciation.
1
CTIA Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA WIRELESS ASS’N,
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA__Survey_Midyear_2010_Graphics.pdf (last visited
Nov. 25, 2011).
2
Wireless
Quick
Facts,
CTIA
WIRELESS
ASS’N,
http://ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Mar. 2,
2012) [hereinafter Wireless Quick Facts].
3
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa.
2008).
4
Wireless
911
Services,
FED.
COMMS.
COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2012); see also 9-1-1 Statistics, NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, http://nena.siteym.com/?page=911statistics (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (stating that of the estimated
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sponse to this increasing percentage of wireless 911 calls, the FCC has
mandated that service providers be able to track ninety percent of
wireless 911 calls within 300 meters of the point of origin and within
one hundred meters of the point of origin for one-hundred percent
5
of wireless 911 calls by January 18, 2016.
Tracking a cell phone’s approximate location from connected
calls has also aided the ends of justice on several occasions. A handful of important examples include: recovering a women’s stolen car
with her five-year-old daughter inside within thirty minutes because
the young girl answered her mother’s cell phone, which enabled the
6
police to use the cell tower information to locate the vehicle; captur7
ing a fugitive wanted for two murders; leading police to a suspect,
who was arrested after a kidnapping and after the murder victim’s
8
DNA was found in his car; providing information that contradicted a
suspect’s statements about his location at home because records
showed that his cell phone was used within about three blocks of the
place of death of his ex-girlfriend shortly before and after she was
9
shot; and the prosecution’s reliance on cell tower record information in the highly publicized Scott Peterson murder trial to contradict Peterson’s claim of his whereabouts at a particular time on the
10
morning of his wife’s death. In all of these instances, the government used cell site location information (CSLI) to provide an approximation of a subscriber’s cell phone location.
Wireless phones are actually sophisticated two-way radios that
11
constantly communicate with nearby cell towers. Through a process
240 million 911 calls annually, one third are wireless calls); Wireless Quick Facts, supra
note 2 (placing the number of emergency 911 calls at over 296,000 per day). As these
sources indicate, the percentage of 911 calls attributable to cell phones has consistently and dramatically increased over the last ten years.
5
911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2011).
6
Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding
the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 310 (2004)
(citing Girl, 5, Found Safe as Man Steals Car, ROCKY MTN. NEWS Apr. 22, 2004, at A18).
7
Id. (citing Don Plummer, Cellphone Betrays Cobb Fugitive, ATLANTA J.- CONST.,
Nov. 9, 2003, at A1).
8
Id. (citing Chuck Haga, Sjodin’s Body Found; Officers Find Remains in Ravine Near
Crookston, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 18, 2004, at B1).
9
Id. at 310–11 (citing Holley Gilbert, Vancouver Man Is Arrested in Shooting Death
of Ex-Girlfriend, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 30, 2004, at B1).
10
Id. at 311 (citing Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial; Defendant Lied
Often, Recorded Calls Show; Supporters Misled About Whereabouts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26,
2004, at B1).
11
How
Wireless
Works,
CTIA
WIRELESS
ASS’N,
http://ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10324(last visited Mar. 2,
2012) [hereinafter How Wireless Works].
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known as “registration,” a cell phone communicates information
identifying the phone, subscriber, and service provider to the cell
tower with the strongest signal, which is then relayed to a mobile tel12
ecommunications switching office (MTSO). Cellular service providers (CSPs), like AT&T or Verizon, record and maintain CSLI for bill13
ing and service purposes in their regular course of business. For
example, a CSP determines roaming charges based on the cell site
14
that a subscriber’s phone uses for a particular call.
Historic CSLI refers to the records maintained by CSPs that list
the cell sites with which a subscriber’s cell phone communicated at
previous points in time, whereas prospective CSLI refers to the cell
sites that a subscriber’s cell phone will communicate with at a future
point in time and the CSP will correspondingly record. Under the
15
Stored Communications Act (SCA), law enforcement agencies may
compel CSPs to disclose prospective or historic CSLI for a particular
cell phone in the course of a criminal investigation. Depending on
the information that the government seeks, the SCA requires either
probable cause and a warrant or reasonable suspicion and a court or16
der for compelled disclosure.
On September 7, 2010, the Third Circuit became the first court
of appeals to weigh in on the standard required for a court order to
compel CSPs to disclose historic CSLI to law enforcement agencies
17
under § 2703(d) of the SCA. In In re Application of the United States for
an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Services to Disclose Records to the Government, an Assistant United States Attorney
(AUSA) sought a § 2703(d) order compelling a CSP to disclose a particular subscriber’s records in connection with the ongoing investiga18
tion of a second individual suspected of drug trafficking. Due to the
government’s difficulties visually surveying the suspected drug trafficker, the AUSA submitted the application for a § 2703(d) order to

12
In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
13
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa.
2008).
14
Id. at 590 n.20.
15
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006).
16
§ 2703.
17
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
18
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv.,
534 F. Supp. 2d at 587–88.
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19

aid in the government’s counter-drug trafficking operations. The
suspected drug trafficker’s historic whereabouts could have provided
the government with evidence of the location(s) of the suspect’s
20
criminal activities. Based on Fourth Amendment privacy concerns
formed by the belief that historic CSLI could provide the government
intimate details about an individual’s life, the magistrate judge denied the government’s original request for an order because the law
enforcement agency failed to show probable cause for obtaining the
21
historic CSLI from the CSP. When the government appealed the
decision to the district court, that court affirmed the decision in a
brief two-page opinion based on the finding that the order was “not
22
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit vacated the decision and
23
remanded the case for further proceedings. The Third Circuit interpreted the statute to allow a magistrate judge to exercise discretion
in granting § 2703(d) orders because the language of the statute
merely sets reasonable suspicion as the minimum requirement for
24
granting an order. Thus, the court did not eliminate the possibility
of magistrate judges in the Third Circuit using different standards
when considering such orders; it simply established that reasonable
suspicion is enough for a judge to grant a law enforcement agency’s
25
request for a § 2703(d) order. If a magistrate judge finds that a warrant is required for the § 2703(d) information sought, the magistrate
judge must make a finding that “the Government’s need . . . for the
information [outweighs] . . . the privacy interests of cell phone users”
26
before issuing the order. Because the magistrate judge “never analyzed whether the Government made a showing” of reasonable suspicion, but instead required a showing of probable cause, the court of
appeals left the issue for the magistrate judge to determine on re27
mand.

19

Id. at 588.
Id. at 588 n.12.
21
Id. at 616.
22
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, No. 07-524M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98761, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008).
23
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
24
Id. at 312.
25
See id.
26
Id. at 319.
27
Id.
20
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Historic CSLI, however, should not be afforded any Fourth
Amendment protection. The Third Circuit’s failure to differentiate
between historic and prospective CSLI does not clarify the standards
that courts should apply to each, nor does it resolve the discrepant
standards that magistrate judges use when granting or denying §
28
2703(d) orders. Instead of analyzing historic and prospective CSLI
through the Fourth Amendment jurisprudential lens and then turning to § 2703(d), the Third Circuit focused on interpreting the statu29
tory language of the SCA. Thus, when presented with the opportunity to formulate appropriate guidelines for judges to use for future
§ 2703(d) order requests from the government, the Third Circuit left
the matter unresolved.
Part II of this Comment will explain the process cell phones use
for sending and receiving calls, messages, and information, as well as
how CSLI data is computed to produce an approximate location of a
cell phone. Part III will provide the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, explain the language and protections provided under
the SCA, and examine the Third Circuit’s interpretation and application of the statute to a § 2703(d) order request. Part IV will argue
that the Third Circuit’s cursory analysis of historic CSLI in light of
the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was incorrect, and
will highlight the resulting failure to set forth guidelines for §
2703(d) order requests that would end the application of discrepant
standards. Finally, Part V will propose an amendment to the statute
that will eliminate the current discrepancy and clarify the requirements for compelled disclosure of historic CSLI.
II. CELL PHONES AND LOCATION APPROXIMATION
The crux of the present issue revolves around historic CSLI. In
order to fully comprehend the problematic treatment of historic
CSLI and why it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, one
should understand what exactly CSLI comprises and how CSLI is
used to calculate approximate location.
A. The Technology of Cell Phones
Cell phones are sophisticated two-way radios that send and re30
ceive communications through the nearest cell site. A cell site is the
28

For a discussion of the discrepant standards that have been applied to §
2703(d) order requests, see infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
29
See infra Part III.C.
30
In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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geographical location containing the cell tower, radio transceiver,
31
and base station controller.
Manufacturers program every cell
phone with an Electronic Serial Number (ESN), and, additionally,
every cell phone is assigned a Mobile Identification Number (MIN)
32
based on the subscriber’s phone number. Moreover, the FCC has
33
assigned every CSP a unique System Identification Code (SID). Eve34
ry cell site broadcasts a control channel, and every cell phone constantly searches for its CSP’s control channel to ensure communica35
tion with a nearby cell site.
While a cell site is the actual location of the cell tower and accompanying equipment, a cell is the geographical area that is served
36
by three cell sites. Because cell towers are divided into three 120°
37
faces, one cell is served by three cell sites. In turn, each cell site
38
serves three separate cells.
The cell site that communicates with a subscriber’s phone will
39
depend on the subscriber’s location within that cell. “Registration”
is the process whereby a subscriber’s cell phone searches for its service provider’s SID, selects a control channel for communication with
40
the base station, and then identifies itself to the cell site. This information is then forwarded to the mobile telecommunications
switching office (MTSO) and stored in a database, completing the
registration process and allowing calls, messages, and information to
41
be directed to the phone. When a call is placed to a subscriber’s
phone, the MTSO searches the database to locate the cell that the
31

Id.
Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work, HOW STUFF
WORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm/printable (last visited
Mar. 5, 2012).
33
Id.
34
Id. A control channel is a special frequency used to broadcast a CSP’s SID
from a base station to a cell phone, which a subscriber’s phone searches for whenever it is turned on to ensure communication with one of the subscriber’s CSP’s cell
sites. Id.
35
Id.
36
Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Cell and Sector Terminology, PRIVATE LINE
(Jan. 1, 2006, 8:55 PM), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html.
37
See id.
38
Id.
39
See Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Basic Theory and Operation, PRIVATE LINE
(Jan. 1, 2005, 9:09 PM), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html.
40
In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005). The cell phone identifies
itself to the cell site by transmitting its ESN and MIN to the base station. Id.
41
Id.
32
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subscriber’s phone is in, and then it routes the call through the most
42
recently registered cell site. The registration process occurs approximately every seven seconds when the phone is turned on, regardless
of whether the phone is in use, and it ensures the strongest signal
43
strength for the subscriber.
Importantly, the channel that is used for this process is separate
from the channel used to transmit the content of calls, messages, or
44
information. When a call is connected to the phone, the control
channel used for registration is dropped, and a new voice channel
45
that has been assigned for the call replaces the registration channel.
Thus, only the cell site that carried the communication, not the
46
communication itself, is recorded by the CSP.
Furthermore, as a person travels towards the edge of a cell, the
original base station notes the decrease in signal strength while the
base station the phone is heading towards recognizes an increase in
47
signal strength. The MTSO coordinates a changeover to the new
48
cell site, which the CSP records.
This continuous process aids in seamlessly sending and receiving
calls, and it is what allows subscribers to travel several miles while
49
maintaining the same uninterrupted phone conversation. When a
cell phone travels outside of a subscriber’s home area, another CSP
will generally provide service for the subscriber’s phone and simply
signal the subscriber’s home network so that the MTSO knows where
50
to direct incoming calls, messages, or information. Therefore, the
subscriber’s CSP records and maintains, as a matter of ordinary busi-

42

Brain, Tyson & Layton, supra note 32.
In re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
44
Id. The significance of this fact is discussed in Part III, infra, which argues that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect historic CSLI and law enforcement agencies should be able to obtain historic CSLI upon a showing of reasonable suspicion
because the channel log does not record any communications; it only evidences the
cell sites with which a particular cell phone communicated at certain times.
45
In re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
46
See id.
47
Brain, Tyson & Layton, supra note 32.
48
Id. The second base station facilitates the changeover to the new cell site by
sending a signal via a control channel that prompts the subscriber’s phone to switch
to a new frequency that then carries the call. Id.
49
See Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 39.
50
How
Wireless
Works,
CTIA
WIRELESS
ASS’N,
http://ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10539 (last visited Mar. 5,
2012). This process is known as roaming, and it is what helps expand the areas in
which cell phones are operational. Id.
43
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ness practice, even the subscriber’s cell phone communications with
cell sites that other CSPs operate.
B. The Methods Used to Approximate Location
CSPs store a subscriber’s registration information in a database
so that communications are routed to the user’s phone via the closest
51
cell site. While the actual communications are only carried on a
52
single channel from one cell site, the phone’s signal is still receiva53
ble by more than one cell site. CSLI is the term used to describe the
records that CSPs keep regarding which cell sites carried a subscriber’s call and which cell sites received the phone’s signal. Because
more than one cell site usually receives the signal, one can determine
the approximate location of the phone by using one of two common
methods: Time Distance of Arrival (TDOA) or Angle of Arrival
54
(AOA).
55
TDOA requires three cell sites to receive the same signal. Because the user is not typically equidistant from all three cell sites, the
56
signal will arrive at each cell site at a different point in time. This
time difference is then analyzed and combined with the known coordinates of the three cell sites to generate the estimated latitude and
57
longitude of the phone.
AOA, on the other hand, requires only two cell sites to receive
the same signal and is based on calculating the angle at which the
58
signal travelled from a user’s phone to the cell site. After determining the angle by which the phone’s signal travelled to each cell site,
one can determine the approximate location of the cell phone using
59
the known locations of the two cell sites.
TDOA generally produces a narrower estimate of location than
AOA, but both provide reliable approximations of a cell phone’s lo-

51

For a detailed discussion how cell phones communicate, see supra Part II.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
53
See Time Difference of Arrival Location Determination, DISPATCH MAG. ON-LINE,
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/tdoa.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter
Time Difference of Arrival Location Determination].
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
AOA–Angle of Arrival, TRUEPOSITION, http://www.trueposition.com/aoa (last
visited Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter AOA–Angle of Arrival].
59
Id.
52
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60

cation. Both of these forms of location approximation do not require adding anything to a cell phone because all of the calculations
are based on the recorded signal information that the phone sends
61
out and the known coordinates of the receiving cell sites. Thus, one
can determine the general area of a cell phone’s location by simply
using information that CSPs record and store in their regular course
of business without modifying or implementing a subscriber’s phone
in any way.
Some scholars have argued that using TDOA or AOA to determine the past approximate location of a cell phone is an impermissible violation of one’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights because it
could provide police with information about an individual’s location
62
that might otherwise be unobtainable. But this information helps
police respond to 911 calls faster, and it can provide valuable information to assist in solving heinous crimes and crimes perpetrated by
63
law enforcement officers.
Critics acknowledge the benefits that
CSLI provides to law enforcements agencies, however, some still argue that both historic and prospective CSLI should not be obtainable
64
without a showing of probable cause and the issuance of a warrant.
Because historic CSLI does not provide the government with the
same information that a tracking device produces, and because it is a
third party who collects and maintains the information in the regular
course of business, the critics’ analogies of historic CSLI to tracking
devices are incorrect, and the Fourth Amendment concerns purportedly implicated are not constitutionally supported.

60

U-TDOA-Uplink Time Difference of Arrival, TRUEPOSITION (last visited Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.trueposition.com/u-tdoa/.
61
See AOA—Angle of Arrival, supra note 58; see also Time Difference of Arrival Location
Determination, supra note 53.
62
See, e.g., Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historic Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1745, 1752, 1788 (2009) (arguing that locational data gleaned from CSLI, historic or
prospective, mandates Fourth Amendment protection); Stephanie Lockwood, Who
Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal
Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 317 (2004) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
should apply to CSLI).
63
Peter J. Sampson, Cellphones Give Feds Insight into Criminal Activity,
(Jan.
18,
2011),
NORTHJERSEY.COM
http://www.northjersey.com/news/114072489_Feds_dialed_in_to_criminals.html?p
age=all.
64
See sources cited supra note 62.
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III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS
ACT
A. Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un65
reasonable searches and seizures.” As a threshold matter, Fourth
Amendment protections apply only when there is a “search” or “sei66
zure.” Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States set forth
67
a two-prong test to determine whether a search has occurred. The
test requires that an individual first “exhibit[] an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
68
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Thus, for an individual to successfully claim that a Fourth Amendment “search” has
taken place, he or she must harbor a personal expectation of privacy
in the information, and that personal expectation of privacy must be
69
shared by an objective, reasonable person. If either prong is not satisfied, then a search has not taken place, and the Fourth Amend70
ment’s protections are not implicated.
Section 2703 of the SCA permits the government to search sub71
scribers’ records. The Supreme Court has examined the government’s search of an individual’s records in the past, but has not directly ruled on § 2703. In 1976 in United States v. Miller, the Court
addressed whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred when the
72
government compelled two banks to disclose a customer’s records.
In Miller, government agents presented subpoenas to the presidents
of the two banks requiring the production of all records of accounts
73
in Miller’s name. The banks complied with the government’s re74
quest without advising Miller about the subpoenas. All records were

65

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
67
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See id.
71
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
72
425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in bank records because there is an inherent risk that the information an individual gives to the
bank will be relayed to the government).
73
Id. at 437.
74
Id. at 438.
66
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made available to the agents, as well as copies of any documents that
75
the agents wished to have.
Although Miller argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed in the information he provided to the banks, the Court held
that the compelled disclosure of Miller’s financial records from the
76
two banks did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The
Court found that the Fourth Amendment did not provide privacy
protection for an individual’s bank records because the documents
77
were “business records of the banks.” The bank was a party to all of
78
Miller’s transactions that were disclosed to the government, the
checks represented “negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions,” and the deposit slips and financial statements rep79
resented voluntarily conveyed information. Thus, Miller “possessed
no Fourth Amendment interest” because the compelled disclosure of
the information was not a search, eliminating the need for a reasona80
bleness assessment or a warrant to obtain the financial information.
Underlying the Court’s rationale in this decision was the “assumption of the risk” doctrine, which is premised on the fact that,
when one voluntarily provides information to a third party, one assumes the risk that the information may be disclosed to the govern81
ment. Three years later, the Court used the same rationale for pen
registers. In Smith v. Maryland, the Court addressed “the question
whether the [government’s] installation and use of a pen register
constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amend82
ment.” The Court distinguished the use of a pen register from a listening device because pen registers “do not acquire the contents of
83
communications”; they merely acquire the numbers dialed. The
Court used this determination to characterize the defendant’s argument as a “claim that he had a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ re84
garding the numbers he dialed on his phone.”

75

Id.
Id. at 442–43.
77
Id. at 440.
78
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440–41.
79
Id. at 442.
80
Id. at 445.
81
Id. at 443.
82
442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979). A pen register is a “mechanical device that records
the numbers dialed on a telephone.” Id. n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
83
Id. at 741.
84
Id. at 742.
76

FOX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

780

5/14/2012 2:21 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:769

In evaluating the subjective expectation of privacy prong, the
Court noted that “[t]elephone users . . . typically know that they must
convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
85
legitimate business purposes.”
Furthermore, the Court declared
that, even if Smith had a subjective expectation of privacy, this expec86
tation was not objectively reasonable. Returning to the “assumption
of the risk” doctrine used in Miller, the Court held that dialed numbers constituted “information . . . voluntarily turn[ed] over to third
parties,” in which courts have consistently denied an expectation of
87
privacy. Because the “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information[,] . . . . [he] assumed the risk that the company would reveal
88
to police the numbers he dialed.” Thus the warrantless use of a pen
register to record the numbers that Smith dialed did not constitute a
89
search under the Fourth Amendment.
Shortly thereafter in a pair of cases decided in consecutive
90
91
terms, United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo, respectively,
the Court addressed the use of tracking beepers by law enforcement
agencies to determine the location of chemicals suspected of being
used for drug production. Employing the use of beepers allows law
enforcement agents to track the object the beeper has been attached
92
to by following the emitted signals, similar to the way in which one
can compute historic CSLI to create a general picture of the movements of a cell phone, but with greater accuracy and in real-time.
In Knotts, law enforcement agents installed a tracking beeper in
a drum of chloroform suspected of being used to manufacture drugs

85

Id. at 743.
Id.
87
Id. at 743–44.
88
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
89
Id. at 745–46.
90
460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that no Fourth Amendment search occurred when the government used a tracking beeper because the information it provided could have been obtained by following the drum of chloroform’s public
movements). A tracking beeper is a “radio transmitter . . . which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” Id. at 277.
91
468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding that a Fourth Amendment search did occur
when the government’s use of a tracking beeper revealed information about the interior of a home that was unobservable from a public place).
92
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
86
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and traced the drum to a secluded residence using the beeper. The
Court noted that the record did not show that the beeper was used
again once the signal indicated that the drum was stationary and lo94
cated in the area of the secluded residence. The agents then used
the beeper transmissions and the information obtained from visual
95
surveillance of the residence to secure a search warrant.
The Court held that the use of the beeper in Knotts did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because law enforcement did not
96
invade any reasonable expectation of privacy. Sitting outside of the
residence, the drum was observable from public places, and it trav97
elled from the point of purchase to the residence over public roads.
The information that the beeper provided would have been ascertainable by “[v]isual surveillance from public places . . . . Nothing in
the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhance98
ment as science and technology afforded them in this case.” The
Court also reiterated that “[a] person travelling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
99
movements from one place to another.” Thus, no search had taken
place because the information gleaned from the beeper was no different than information that law enforcement agents could have obtained by observing the public movements of the drum of chloro100
form.
The following term, the Court revisited law enforcement agents’
warrantless use of tracking beepers. In Karo, police placed a tracking
beeper inside a container of ether that they suspected was going to be
101
used to extract cocaine from clothing.
Law enforcement agents
used the beeper, along with visual surveillance, to follow the ether
from the point of purchase to a residence, but use of the beeper did
102
not end once the location of the residence was known. The police
continually used the beeper over a prolonged period of time to track
the ether, and determined its location to be inside different private
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 277–78.
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 282.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 285.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
Id.
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103

residences on multiple occasions. Part of the information that the
agents provided to obtain a search warrant for the final residence was
104
the tracking beeper’s location.
The Court distinguished the facts of Karo from those in Knotts.
The Karo Court noted that the agents conceded that the tracking
beeper was used to locate the can of ether inside a particular private
105
residence.
The question presented, therefore, was “whether the
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to
visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those
106
who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.” Because the beeper provided the police with information not ascertainable by visual surveillance from outside the curtilage of the home, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment privacy interest that an indi107
vidual has in his or her private residence was violated.
Thus, the
Court drew a public/private dichotomy when analyzing the Fourth
Amendment implications of warrantless use of a tracking beeper.
B. The Language and Protections of the Stored Communications Act
The SCA regulates access to stored wire and electronic commu108
nications information and transactional records.
The SCA describes the procedures available to law enforcement agencies to obtain this information and clearly creates two separate, exclusive
categories: information and records that contain the contents of
109
communications and information or records that do not contain
110
the contents of communications. Section 2703 prescribes the procedures that the government must follow to obtain information con111
taining the contents of communications in electronic storage, information containing the contents of communications in a remote
103

Id. at 708–10.
Id. at 709–10.
105
Id. at 714.
106
Id.
107
Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (“[The beeper] reveal[ed] a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that
it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”).
108
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006).
109
§ 2703(a)–(b) (providing the requirements for compelled disclosure of the
contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage and a remote
computing service, respectively).
110
§ 2703(c) (providing the requirements for compelled disclosure of “record[s]
or other information pertaining to a subscriber . . . (not including the contents of
communications)”).
111
§ 2703(a).
104
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112

computing service, and records in electronic storage or a remote
computing service that do not include the communications’ con113
tents.
A law enforcement agency may compel disclosure of information
that does not include the content of the communications if the agen114
cy meets the guidelines of § 2703(c).
There are three different
means by which a law enforcement agency may compel a CSP to dis115
close a subscriber’s CSLI: the agency may “obtain[] a warrant,” “ob116
tain[] a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d),” or
117
get “the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure.”
Specifically, a § 2703(d) “court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the
records or other information sought[] are relevant and material to
118
an ongoing criminal investigation.”
Therefore, a law enforcement
agency’s showing of reasonable suspicion is enough for a court to
grant a governmental entity’s § 2703(d) order request. The government is not statutorily required to show probable cause in order to
obtain a court order compelling a CSP to disclose a subscriber’s records.
In practice, however, judges do not always uphold this standard.
The same district in New York has applied two different standards to
§ 2703(d) requests by the government. A magistrate judge denied an
application for a § 2703(d) order compelling disclosure of historic
CSLI due to “the Fourth Amendment requir[ing] the government to
obtain a warrant, based on a showing of probable cause on oath or
119
affirmation, in order to secure” the historic CSLI sought. The opinion acknowledged that the information sought was limited to historic
CSLI for a specified period, but the court held that such information
120
was protected by the Fourth Amendment.

112

§ 2703(b).
§ 2703(c).
114
Id.
115
§ 2703(c)(1)(A).
116
§ 2703(c)(1)(B).
117
§ 2703(c)(1)(C).
118
§ 2703(d).
119
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Information, No. 10-MJ-0550, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88781, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 27, 2010).
120
Id. at *13.
113
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At the other end of the spectrum, a district court judge granted
the government’s § 2703(d) order request to compel a CSP to disclose prospective CSLI after presenting “specific and articulable facts
showing reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought
121
[wa]s relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
These two cases, both from the Eastern District of New York, are a
perfect example of the discrepant standards that currently exist for §
2703(d) order requests by the government. This illustrates the lack
of uniformity in the application of a single statutory provision.
Historic CSLI is content free, and reveals the cell site with which
a cell phone communicated during a call, not the information that
122
was communicated during a call. Still, historic CSLI must fall within the scope of the SCA for § 2703 to compel CSP disclosure. When
applying the SCA, courts must read the definition of certain SCA
terms using the definitions that Congress gave to the identical terms
123
under § 2510.
Because the SCA only applies to “stored wire and
electronic communications,” the threshold question is whether the
information sought constitutes wire communications or electronic
124
communications as defined by § 2510.
C. Judge Sloviter’s Opinion’s Interpretation and Application of the
SCA
Commentators have argued that cell phones do not send or re125
ceive wire communications because the transfer of information is
not “made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the point of recep126
127
tion.” While it is true that a cell phone operates as a radio, in In re
121
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(stating, after granting a § 2703(d) order for prospective CSLI based on only a showing of reasonable suspicion, that it would reveal the cell phone’s “general location—
and in some circumstances, permit law enforcement agents to track the precise
movements—of a particular cellular telephone on a real-time basis”).
122
See supra Part II.B (describing that CSLI is information that pertains to the cell
site the wireless phone communicated with, not the actual content of a call, message,
or information that was sent or received by the wireless phone).
123
18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (2006).
124
Id. § 2703.
125
See Chamberlain, supra note 62, at 1757 (arguing that the cell phones are automatically excluded from wire communications because of their wireless operation).
126
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006).
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Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Services to Disclose Records to the Government, Judge
Sloviter affirmed that CSLI “consists of records of information collected by cell towers when a subscriber makes a cellular call. That
historical record is derived from a ‘wire communication’ and does
128
not itself comprise a separate ‘electronic communication.’”
Electronic communication, the other category of information
obtainable under the SCA, is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic,
129
photoelectronic or photoptical system.”
The definition, however,
excludes four types of communications that would otherwise quali130
fy, one of which is “any communication from a tracking device” as
131
defined by § 3117.
A tracking device is “an electronic or mechanical device which
132
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.” Thus,
commentators have also argued that the compelled disclosure of historic CSLI based on the SCA alone pursuant to a § 2703(d) order requires a showing of probable cause and a warrant because a cell
phone meets the statutory definition of a tracking device and is there133
fore excluded from the SCA.
This argument, however, overlooks
the fact that “the Senate Report on the ECPA, which encompasses the
SCA, defines ‘electronic tracking devices’ as ‘one-way radio communication devices that emit a signal on a specific radio frequency . . .
[that] can be received by special tracking equipment, and allows the
134
user to trace the geographical location of the transponder.’” Since
135
cell phones are sophisticated two-way radios, unlike the devices described in the Senate report, the tracking device definition of §

127

How Wireless Works, supra note 11.
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2010).
129
§ 2510(12) (emphasis added); see How Wireless Works, supra note 11 (explaining
that cell phones are sophisticated two-way radios).
130
§ 2510(12)(A)–(D).
131
§ 2510(12)(C).
132
§ 3117(b).
133
See, e.g., Chamberlain, supra note 62 at 1775–77 (arguing that a cell phone falls
under the statutory definition of a tracking device, and therefore the SCA prohibits
compelled disclosure of historic CSLI absent a showing of probable cause).
134
In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t , 620 F.3d 304, 309 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564).
135
How Wireless Works, supra note 11.
128
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3117(b) does not encompass cell phones. Thus, historic CSLI is not
excluded from the SCA because historic CLSI qualifies as a record of
136
electronic communications.
Furthermore, under the definition of CSLI as a wire communi137
cation, even if a cell phone was considered a tracking device, the
government could still compel CSP disclosure because the tracking
device exclusion only applies to stored electronic communications,
138
not stored wire communications.
Thus, Judge Sloviter’s opinion
correctly held “that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a
§ 2703(d) order and . . . such an order does not require the tradi139
tional probable cause determination.” Instead, the reasonable suspicion language in the text of § 2703(d) is the minimum standard
140
that applies to a § 2703(d) order request.
This finding, however, was not the end of the Third Circuit’s
statutory examination of § 2703(d). Upon a closer reading of the
statute, the court revealed that the language employed in § 2703(d)
seemingly sets reasonable suspicion as the floor, but allows for the
141
exercise of judicial discretion in requiring a higher standard. Section 2703(d) clearly states that “[a] court order for disclosure under
subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if” reasonable suspicion is
142
met. Focusing first on the “may be issued” language, the court stated that it was “the language of permission, rather than mandate. If
Congress wished that courts ‘shall,’ rather than ‘may,’ issue § 2703(d)
orders whenever . . . [reasonable suspicion] is met, Congress could
143
easily have said so.” The court went on to declare that “[a]t the very
144
least, the use of ‘may issue’ strongly implies court discretion.”
136
In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at
312–13.
137
Id. at 310
138
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006); see also supra text accompanying notes 129–32 (explaining that tracking devices are excluded from the statutory definition of electronic communications).
139
In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at
313.
140
Id. (quoting the standard provided in the text of § 2703(d) as requiring “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”).
141
Id. at 315.
142
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
143
In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. , 620 F.3d
at 315.
144
Id.
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Noting this discretionary language, the court examined the “on145
ly if” language next. Relying on a previous Third Circuit decision,
the court articulated that the “phrase ‘only if’ describe[s] a necessary
condition, not a sufficient condition, and that while a ‘necessary condition describes a prerequisite,’ a ‘sufficient condition is a guaran146
tee.’”
Therefore, according to the Third Circuit, the statute does
not require a judge to issue a § 2703(d) order compelling a CSP to
disclose a record upon a showing of reasonable suspicion by the government, but rather it is the minimum requirement that must be met
147
for such an order to issue.
Thus, Judge Sloviter’s opinion correctly found that historic CSLI
is obtainable under § 2703(d) of the SCA regardless of whether one
characterizes historic CSLI as an electronic communication or a wire
communication. Because cell phones are not included in the tracking device definition of § 3117(b), historic CSLI is not one of the
four types of electronic communications excluded from being obtainable under the SCA. Additionally, historic CSLI is derived from a
wire communication because it is a record collected by a cell tower.
Thus, historic CSLI is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order upon the
statutorily required showing of reasonable suspicion, and the traditional probable cause determination is not required.
IV. CSLI, FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE, AND
MISINTERPRETATION OF JUDGE SLOVITER’S OPINION
While the court’s statutory interpretation and application are
generally sound, the court’s cursory Fourth Amendment analysis of
historic CSLI was incorrect. The Fourth Amendment does not protect historic CSLI. By leaving that possibility open, Judge Sloviter’s
opinion will not eliminate the discrepant standards that judges apply
to § 2703(d) order requests. While the court did not hold that the
Fourth Amendment protects historic CSLI, it allowed a magistrate
148
judge to make such a finding in the future. Should the magistrate
so find, “a full explanation that balances the Government’s need (not

145

Id.
Id. at 316 (quoting Township of Tinicum v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 582 F.3d
482, 488–89 (3d. Cir. 2009)).
147
See id. at 316–17 (reiterating the Third Circuit’s previous interpretation of
identical statutory language, accepting the EFF brief’s argument that this creates a
“sliding scale,” and rejecting the government’s argument that the language provides
for mandatory issuance of an order if reasonable suspicion is shown).
148
Id. at 319.
146

FOX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

788

5/14/2012 2:21 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:769

merely desire) for the information with the privacy interests of cell
149
phone users” is necessary.
Curiously, the court rejected the “assumption of the risk” doctrine as applicable to CSLI based on the finding that “[a] cell phone
customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a
150
cellular provider in any meaningful way.”
The “assumption of the
risk” doctrine was the underlying rationale that the Supreme Court
151
Here, the court relied on
used in deciding both Miller and Smith.
the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) brief’s claim that cell
phone subscribers are unlikely to be aware that a CSP records histori152
cal CSLI.
This assertion is inapposite to the Supreme Court’s rationale in the Smith decision.
In Smith, the telephone customer was presumed to know that the
phone company would record, for business purposes, the numbers
153
he dialed on his telephone. Furthermore, the Court explicitly held
that the dialed numbers were information voluntarily conveyed to a
154
third party. The same reasoning and rationale apply directly to cell
phone subscribers and historic CSLI. CSPs record CSLI for business
purposes, and a cell phone customer should similarly be presumed to
know that this information will be recorded because CSPs use it to
determine roaming charges that appear on a subscriber’s monthly
155
statement. Thus, the roaming charges on the billing statement indicate to the subscriber that the physical location of the phone during a call is known and recorded by the subscriber’s CSP in its regular
course of business. Thus, by using the cell phone the subscriber voluntarily conveys to the CSP the phone’s general geographical location.
Additionally, the prevalence of cell phones with GPS functions
156
and subscribers’ increased use of these services directly undermine
the position that cell phone customers are not “voluntarily” sharing
their location information with CSPs. Therefore, a cell phone user

149

In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv., 620 F.3d at

319.
150

Id. at 317.
See supra text accompanying notes 81, 87–88 (describing the “assumption of
the risk” doctrine and its application to the facts of Miller and Smith).
152
In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. , 620 F.3d
at 317.
153
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
154
Id. at 743–44.
155
See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
156
See supra note 1–3 and accompanying text.
151
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has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the CSLI that the CSP
records when the user makes or receives a call because the subscriber
has voluntarily shared this information with the CSP and assumes the
risk that the CSP may turn the information over to law enforcement
agencies. Moreover, cell phone subscribers who simply pay their
monthly bills without looking at them and who do not have GPS
functions on their phones are still likely to know that the government
uses such techniques due to the high-profile crimes that law en157
forcement agencies have reported and solved with the help of CSLI.
Furthermore, when analyzing CSLI, courts must apply the public/private dichotomy that the Knotts and Karo decisions created. In
Knotts, the Court emphasized the fact that law enforcement agents
only used the tracking beeper to follow the movements of a drum of
chloroform on public thoroughfares until they determined that the
drum had come to rest in the area of a secluded residence, at which
time they discontinued the use of the tracking beeper and visually
confirmed the presence of the drum of chloroform outside the resi158
dence.
The Court was quick to distinguish these facts in Karo, in
which law enforcement agents used the tracking beeper to confirm
the presence of a can of ether inside multiple residences, on multiple
159
occasions.
The Fourth Amendment protections afforded to the
home made the warrantless use of a tracking beeper that revealed
otherwise unascertainable information and that was conducted from
160
outside the curtilage of the residence unconstitutional.
Moreover, CSLI requires different treatment than tracking
beepers because CSLI does not provide the precise location information of a cell phone, but it does provide the CSP with the cell site
161
that helped carry a call. This information does not provide the actual location of the cell phone because CSLI only gives the cell tower
location used to carry a call and because location calculations based
on cell towers give only an approximation of a subscriber’s phone’s
162
location.
If multiple cell sites record CSLI, the approximate loca163
tion of the cell phone at the initiation of the call can be computed.
This approximate location, however, provides the general area of the

157
158
159
160
161
162
163

See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278–79 (1983).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708–10 (1984).
Id. at 715.
See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text
See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text
See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text
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164

caller, not the exact location.
A tracking beeper, on the other
165
hand, can be traced to a precise location. Thus, even using TDOA
166
or AOA, historic CSLI cannot show that a subscriber was at a particular place at a particular time; it can only show that the phone was
in the general area.
In light of these two characteristics, CSLI falls outside of the traditional Fourth Amendment protections. Accordingly, when a law
enforcement agent uses voluntarily conveyed historic CSLI information to approximate a subscriber’s location, it does not constitute
a Fourth Amendment search. Thus, the necessary “search” or “sei167
zure” required for applying the Fourth Amendment protections is
not met when CSPs disclose historic CSLI to a law enforcement agency, but Judge Sloviter’s opinion’s failure to make this determination
has left magistrate judges without a definitive guideline for granting §
2703(d) orders.
Admittedly, the statute provides for judicial discretion in granting § 2703(d) orders, but had the Third Circuit thoroughly analyzed
the Fourth Amendment’s application to historic CSLI, it would have
held Fourth Amendment protections inapplicable to historic CSLI
and curbed judicial discretion in granting § 2703(d) orders for this
particular type of information. As it currently stands, a judge may require probable cause for a § 2703(d) order requesting historic CSLI
if the privacy interests of the cell phone user outweigh the govern168
ment’s need for the information.
A finding that cell phone subscribers do not have a privacy interest in historic CSLI would have
eliminated the possibility for discrepant application of standards in §
2703(d) order requests for historic CSLI.
V. PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT
Because Judge Sloviter’s opinion has not alleviated the possibility
of magistrate judges applying discrepant standards to § 2703(d) requests, which results directly from the permissive statutory language,
a statutory amendment is well overdue. Eliminating the “only if” language from § 2703(d), as well as changing “may be issued” to “shall

164

See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
166
For a discussion of the TDOA and AOA methods for determining approximate
location of a cell phone, see supra notes 54– 61 and accompanying text
167
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also supra text accompanying note 65.
168
In re Application for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t , 620 F.3d 304,319 (3d Cir. 2010).
165
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be issued” would correct the current problem. An amended version
of § 2703(d) would then read:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) shall be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and
shall issue if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.

Although the Fourth Amendment does not protect historic
169
CSLI, the revised statute would still provide a level of judicial oversight that would prevent law enforcement agencies from conducting
fishing expeditions. In order for the government to compel a CSP to
disclose historic CSLI, courts would still require specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of the records sought are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation. Thus, unless the government can
provide a judge with information showing reasonable suspicion that a
subscriber’s cell phone records are material to on ongoing criminal
investigation, a § 2703(d) order would not be granted.
Alternatively, if Congress believes that cell phone users have a
strong privacy interest in historic CSLI, Congress should entirely
eliminate the § 2703(d) order requirement from the SCA, and courts
should apply the probable cause or subscriber-consent standards required by § 2703(a)–(c). Although the heightened requirement
would provide a greater burden on the ability of law enforcement
agencies to compel disclosure of historic CSLI, at least the application of the statute would be uniform. Currently, some citizens are erroneously granted Fourth Amendment privacy rights for their historic CSLI, while others are denied Fourth Amendment protection for
170
their prospective CSLI. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to
historic CSLI, leaving the statute as the only applicable protection.
Therefore, an amendment to § 2703(d) is necessary to ensure that
courts apply uniformly the protections that the SCA affords to historic CSLI.
VI. CONCLUSION
To date, the Third Circuit is the first and only appellate court to
weigh in on the appropriate standard for § 2703(d) order requests.

169
170

See discussion supra Part IV.
See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
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While the court’s statutory analysis concerning the definitions and
applicability of § 2703(d) order requests to historic CSLI was correct,
unfortunately, Judge Sloviter’s opinion failed to analyze the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to historic CSLI. By neglecting to
highlight the constitutional distinction between prospective and historic CSLI, the Third Circuit’s holding will likely fail to remedy the
discrepant standards that courts have applied to the government’s §
2703(d) order requests.
Because of the ever-increasing dependence on cell phones by
citizens in their day-to-day lives and by the government for solving
crimes and providing services, the problem of discrepant application
of standards for § 2703(d) order requests is sure to persist. Absent a
rapid increase in circuit court litigation that creates a split in authority on the matter that may prompt the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, a congressional amendment to the statute is the only available
remedy to this problem in the near future.
Historic CSLI is only protected by the SCA, not the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause is neither statutorily nor constitutionally mandated for the disclosure of historic CSLI to law enforcement
agencies. Because, as demonstrated in this Comment, the problem
will likely not find a solution in the courts, the impetus is on Congress
to amend the statute to ensure equal application of § 2703(d)’s provisions. While Judge Sloviter’s opinion attempted to address and resolve the issue, ultimately the problem remains largely unchanged
because it failed to address whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to historic CSLI. Had the Third Circuit performed this analysis, the
discretionary language of § 2703(d) would have been rendered moot.
The usefulness and benefits of historic CSLI to law enforcement
agents conducting criminal investigations is readily apparent. The
Fourth Amendment does not protect historic CSLI, but Judge
Sloviter’s opinion failed to make this finding and distinguish historic
CSLI from prospective CSLI. Thus, absent a circuit court holding
historic CSLI is not protected by the Fourth Amendment or a statutory amendment by Congress, judges nationwide may still incorrectly
grant historic CSLI Fourth Amendment privacy protections and continue to apply discrepant standards to § 2703(d) order requests by
the government. Unfortunately, the Third Circuit clarified the issue,
but failed to resolve it, and the hope now is that Congress will amend
the SCA and end the discrepant application of the statute.

